Abstract. The diagonalization argument of Putnam (1963) denies the possibility of a universal learning machine. Yet the proposal of Solomonoff (1964) and Levin (1970) promises precisely such a thing. In this paper I discuss how their proposed measure function manages to evade Putnam's diagonalization in one respect, only to fatally fall prey to it in another.
1. Putnam (1963a) famously challenged the feasibility of Carnap's program of inductive logic on the grounds that a quantitative definition of "degree of confirmation" can never be adequate as a rational reconstruction of inductive reasoning. Consider a simple language with a monadic predicate G and an ordered infinity of individuals x i , i ∈ N, and let a computable hypothesis h be a computable set of sentences h(x i ) for each individual x i , where h(x i ) equals one of Gx i and ¬Gx i . Then a natural condition of adequacy on any proposed measure function P is that (I) For any true computable hypothesis h, the instance confirmation P (h(x n+1 ) | h(x 0 ), ..., h(x n )) should pass and remain above threshold 0.5 after sufficiently many confirming individuals x 0 , ..., x n . (Since our actual inductive methods are sure to discern a computable pattern eventually, so should a reconstruction of them.) But for any measure function P that is itself at least effectively computable in a weak sense (so as to qualify, with the Church-Turing thesis, as an explicit method):
(II) For any true computable hypothesis h, for every n, it must be possible to compute an m such that if h(x n+1 ), ..., h(x n+m ) hold, then P (h(x n+m+1 ) | h(x 0 ), ..., h(x n+m )) exceeds 0.5, one can prove by diagonalization P 's violation of (I).
Thus, if the ideal inductive policy fulfills (I) and (II), then it is provably impossible to reconstruct it as a measure function. But maybe such a policy is so idealized as to thwart any formalization? To seal the fate of Carnap's program, Putnam proceeds to give an example of an inductive method that is not based on a measure function and that does satisfy the two requirements. This method M is in effect the hypothetico-deductive method : supposing some enumeration of hypotheses that are proposed over time, at each point in time select and use for prediction (accept) the hypothesis first in line among those that have been consistent with past data. Then: Date: May 14, 2016. (III) For any true computable hypothesis h, if h is ever proposed, then method M will eventually come to (and forever remain to) accept it.
The distinctive feature of M is that it relies on the hypotheses that are actually proposed. To Putnam, this is as it should be. Not only does it conform to scientific practice: more fundamentally, it does justice to the "indispensability of theories as instruments of prediction" (ibid., 778 ). This appears to be the overarching reason why Putnam takes issue with Carnap's program: "certainly it appears implausible to say that there is a rule whereby one can go from the observational facts . . . to the observational prediction without any 'detour' into the realm of theory. But this is a consequence of the supposition that degree of confirmation can be 'adequately defined'" (ibid., 780). Incredulously: "we get the further consequence that it is possible in principle to build an electronic computer such that, if it could somehow be given all the observational facts, it would always make the best prediction-i.e. the prediction that would be made by the best possible scientist if he had the best possible theories. Science could in principle be done by a moron (or an electronic computer)" (ibid., 781).
Here Putnam is still careful not to attribute to Carnap too strong a view: "Of course, I am not accusing Carnap of believing or stating that such a rule exists; the existence of such a rule is a disguised consequence of the assumption that [degree of confirmation] can be 'adequately defined'" (ibid., 780). Carnap indeed seemed reluctant to commit himself to the idea of an "inductive machine" (see Carnap, 1950, 192-99) . Nevertheless, in his Radio Free Europe address (1963b), Putnam declares that "we may think of a system of inductive logic as a design for a 'learning machine': that is to say, a design for a computing machine that can extrapolate certain kinds of empirical regularities from the data with which it is supplied" (1963b, 297); and "if there is such a thing as a correct 'degree of confirmation' which can be fixed once and for all, then a machine which predicted in accordance with the degree of confirmation would be an optimal, that is to say, a cleverest possible learning machine" (ibid., 298). Again, the diagonalization proof would show that there can be no such thing: it is "an argument against the existence -that is, against the possible existence -of a 'cleverest possible' learning machine" (ibid., 299).
2. Solomonoff (1964) aimed to describe precisely that: an "optimum" learning machine, a formal system of inductive inference that "is at least as good as any other that may be proposed" (ibid., 5). His ideas can indeed be seen as a particular offspring of Carnap's inductive logic; one that takes Putnam's picture of a learning machine seriously.
Solomonoff's mission statement is clear: "The problem dealt with will be the extrapolation of a long sequence of symbols" (ibid., 2). We seek the probability that a given (long) sequence T is followed by a (one-symbol) sequence a. "In the language of Carnap (1950) , we want c(a, T ), the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis that a will follow, given the evidence that T has just occurred" (ibid.). The underlying motivation is also very much in accord with things Carnap writes in his 1950 book. Solomonoff's suggestion that "all problems in inductive inference . . . can be expressed in the form of the extrapolation of a long sequence of symbols" (ibid.) parallels Carnap's insistence on the primacy of the predictive inference -"the most important and fundamental inductive inference" (1950, 207) . And Carnap's discussion under the header "Are Laws Needed for Making Predictions?" (ibid., 574-75) -conclusion: "the use of laws is not indispensable" -is easily read as informing Solomonoff's proclamation that his proposed methods are "meant to bypass the explicit formulation of scientific laws, and use the data of the past directly to make inductive inferences about specific future events" (1964, 16) .
This already very much resembles the picture that Putnam painted in order to challenge it. What is more, the problem setting of sequence extrapolation is readily translatable into the formal set-up that Putnam presupposes in his paper. Let us suppose, as is customary in modern discussions of Solomonoff's theory, that we have an alphabet of only two symbols, '0' and '1'. Now Putnam assumes with Carnap a monadic predicate language L, but with an ordered domain x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . of individuals. Let L have a single monadic predicate G. Identifying the individuals with positions in a sequence as Putnam does (1963a, 766) , we can have a '1' at the i-th position express the fact that individual x i satisfies G, and a '0' that it does not. Thus we translate a symbol sequence of length n into the observation of the first n individuals. Solomonoff's setting is then fully within the scope of Putnam's argument. This in contrast to that of Carnap, who could still resort to the defense that in his works he does not assume an ordered domain, and so "the difficulties which Putnam discusses do not apply to the inductive methods which I have presented in my publications " (1963a, 986) . Nevertheless, Carnap does acknowledge at various places the need for taking into consideration the order of individuals in explicating degree of confirmation (e.g., 1950, 62-65; 1963b, 225-26) ; and he envisioned for this future project the same kind of "coordinate language" that Putnam assumes (also see Skyrms, 1991) . For such a language, Carnap should have agreed with Putnam's charge that an inductive system that is "not 'clever' enough to learn that position in the sequence is relevant" is too weak to be adequate. The difference in opinion then ultimately comes down to what regularities in the observed individuals should be extrapolated (i.e., what hypotheses or patterns should gain higher instance confirmation from supporting observations). Carnap states in (1963a, 987; 1963b, 226) that he would only consider "laws of finite span." In terms of symbol sequence extrapolation, these are the hypotheses that make the probability of a certain symbol's occurrence at a certain position only depend on the immediately preceding subsequence of a fixed finite length (i.e., a Markov chain of certain order). In particular, hypotheses must not refer to absolute coordinates, which immediately rules out Putnam's example of the hypothesis that "the prime numbers are occupied by red " (1963a, 765) . In Carnap's view, "no physicist would seriously consider a law like Putnam's prime number law" (1963a, 987) , hence "it is hardly worthwhile to take account of such laws in adequacy conditions for c-functions " (1963b, 226) . According to Putnam, however, "existing inductive methods are capable of establishing the correctness of such a hypothesis . . . and so must any adequate 'reconstruction' of these methods " (1963a, 765) . Indeed, the same goes for any effectively computable pattern; this is his adequacy condition (I).
Others have charged Carnap's confirmation functions with an inability to meet various adequacy conditions on recognizing regularities (notably Achinstein, 1963;  in fact the critique of Goodman, 1946 Goodman, , 1947 can be seen as an early instance of this line of attack). What is distinctive about Putnam's adequacy conditions is the emphasis on effective computability. Interestingly, this notion of effective computability is also the fundamental ingredient in Solomonoff's proposal. It is this aspect that genuinely sets Solomonoff's approach apart from Carnap's. The measure functions that Solomonoff proposed in (1964) , and that evolved in the modern definition of a measure function Q f that we will see below, were explicitly defined in terms of the inputs to a universal Turing machine. Moreover, one can show that the instance confirmation via Q f of any true computable hypothesis will converge to 1, thus fulfilling (I).
3.
How does Solomonoff evade Putnam's diagonalization? If Q f is within the scope of Putnam's argument, and it still fulfills (I), then it must give way with respect to (II). To see how Q f fulfills (I) but not (II), we will need to go into the details. This we do in the current section; in the next section we return to the main thread and ask ourselves what this means for Q f as a purported "optimum," or universal learning machine.
Specifically, we will work in this section towards the precise specification of Q f , and prove that it satisfies (I). For a large part this amounts to retracing the formal setting that was developed in the landmark paper of Zvonkin and Levin (1970) , based on Levin's doctoral thesis (translated as Levin, 2010) .
We start with the notion of a computable (probability) measure on the Cantor space {0, 1} ω , the set of all infinite sequences of symbols in {0, 1}. A computable measure on {0, 1} ω is generated in the standard way (according to "Method I" in Rogers, 1970, 9ff ; also see Reimann, 2009, 249-256; Nies, 2009, 68-70 ) from a computable premeasure. A premeasure that generates a probability measure is a function m : {0, 1} * → [0, 1] on the finite sequences that satisfies m( ) = 1 for the empty sequence and m(x0) + m(x1) = m(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1} * ; the resulting measure µ m will then satisfy µ m ( x ) = m(x) for every cylinder x = {X ∈ {0, 1} ω : x X}, i.e., class of infinite extensions of finite x. I will sometimes be sloppy and simply write "µ(x)" for "µ( x )." A premeasure is computable if its values are uniformly computable reals: there is a computable f : {0,
A computable measure is also called a ∆ 0 1 measure. We will see below that the Solomonoff-Levin measure function Q f has the following property.
(I') For any true ∆ 0 1 measure µ, with probability 1, the values Q f (x t+1 | x t ) for x t+1 ∈ {0, 1} converge to the values µ(x t+1 | x t ) as t goes to infinity. This is a generalization of Putnam's condition (I) from "deterministic" computable hypotheses or single infinite computable sequences to computable probability measures on infinite sequences.
We proceed with our discussion of computable measures. The most basic (∆ 0 1 ) measure on Cantor space is the uniform measure λ. It is generated from the premeasure with m(x) = 2 −|x| for all x, where |x| denotes x's length. We can obtain other measures as transformations of λ by Borel functions F :
. Every other Borel measure µ on Cantor space can be obtained as a transformation λ F = µ by some Borel function F .
We are interested in transformations by functions that are effectively computable. To that end we introduce mappings f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * on finite sequences, mappings that have to satisfy a condition of monotonicity: if x y then also f (x) f (y). Consider the function Φ f : X → sup {f (x) : x X} induced by f . If sup {f (x) : x X} is an infinite sequence for all infinite X, then Φ f gives a total function F : {0, 1} ω → {0, 1} ω . If not, then we have to restrict the domain and Φ f is a partial function on {0, 1}
ω . Alternatively, we can treat Φ f as a total function {0,
* on the collection of infinite and finite sequences.
To specify a computable monotone mapping, we note that f can be represented by the set M f ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * of pairs of sequences (x, y) such that f (x) y. Then a computable monotone mapping is a monotone mapping f with c.e. M f . One can visualize a computable monotone mapping as a particular type of Turing machine, one that operates on a steady stream of input symbols, producing an (in)finite output sequence in the process. Originally dubbed an algorithmic process (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970, 99) , this type of machine is now better known as a monotone machine. (Also see Shen, Uspenky, and Vereshchagin 2014, 141-44.) The transformation λ f by monotone mapping f is given by the premeasure m : y → λ( {x : f (x) y} ), mapping to each sequence y the uniform measure of the input sequences x that lead f to produce it (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970, 100) . If computable monotone mapping f produces an infinite sequence with uniform probability 1 (i.e., the class of X with infinite Φ f (X) has uniform measure 1), then the transformation λ f is a premeasure that again generates a ∆ 0 1 measure on {0, 1} ω (ibid.). Every other ∆ 0 1 measure can be obtained as a λ-transformation λ f = µ of some such "almost total" computable monotone mapping f .
However, if there is some finite y such that with positive uniform probability machine f stops producing more symbols after y (that is, the class of X with finite Φ f (X) has positive uniform probability), then λ f (y) is strictly greater than λ f (y0)+λ f (y1). A function λ f can thus be interpreted as a premeasure generating a measure on the collection of infinite and finite sequences (ibid., 102). (Alternatively, one can interpret such a function as a "semimeasure" on {0, 1} ω (Levin and V'yugin, 1977, 360) , a "defective" probability measure. See Li and Vitányi (2008, 264; 331-32) .)
Levin calls the class of (measures generated from the) transformations λ f by all monotone machines f the class of semi-computable measures on {0, 1} ω ∪ {0, 1} * . This is because these transformations are precisely the functions m :
for all x that satisfy a weaker requirement of computability, that we may paraphrase as computable approximability from below (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970, 102-03) . In exact terms (also see Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010, 202-03) , we call m (lower) semi-computable if there is a computable f : {0, 1} * × N → Q such that for all x ∈ {0, 1} * we have f (x, t) ≤ f (x, t + 1) for all t ∈ N and lim t→∞ f (x, t) = m(x). Equivalently, the left-cut {(q, x) ∈ Q × {0, 1} * : q < m(x)} is c.e. A semi-computable measure is also called a Σ 0 1 measure. It is instructive to note the analogy between, on the one hand, the expansion from the ∆ 0 1 to the Σ 0 1 measures, and, on the other, the expansion from the total computable (t.c.) to the partial computable (p.c.) functions. It is well-known that the class of t.c. functions is diagonalizable, and that this is overcome by enlarging the class to the p.c. functions. In other words, the class of all t.c. functions is not effectively enumerable; the class of p.c. functions is. Likewise, the class of ∆ (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970, 103-04) . Informally, such a measure "is 'larger' than any other measure, and is concentrated on the widest subset of [{0, 1}
ω ∪ {0, 1} * ]" (ibid., 104). Formally, a universal Σ 0 1 measure µ µ µ is such that it dominates every other Σ 0 1 measure: for every
This fact is one of the reasons for introducing the concept of semi-computable measure" (ibid.) -we may take it as the main reason. In fact, the expansion to Σ 0 1 objects in order to obtain universal elements is a move that returns in many related contexts. Martin-Löf (1966) , in defining his influential notion of algorithmic randomness, employed the class of all Σ 0 1 randomness tests: a sequence X is random if it passes a universal such test. Vovk (2001b) , in defining his notion of predictive complexity, employed the class of Σ 0 1 loss processes: the predictive complexity of X is the loss incurred by a universal such process. Vovk and Watkins (1998, 17) : "It would be ideal if the class of computable loss processes contains a smallest (say, to within an additive constant) element. Unfortunately . . . such a smallest element does not exist." Levin's suggestion to widen the class to the Σ 0 1 elements is then "a very natural solution to the problem of non-existence of a smallest computable loss process" (ibid.).
An example of a universal Σ 0 1 measure is easily given. Since the computable monotone mappings are also effectively enumerable, we can likewise specify universal such mappings. Let {z i } i∈N some computable prefix-free (i.e., z i z j ⇒ i = j) encoding of all computable monotone mappings f i . The corresponding universal monotone mapping f is defined by (z i x, y) ∈ M f :⇔ (x, y) ∈ M fi . It is straightforward to show that the transformation λ f of λ by universal f gives a universal Σ 0 1 measure.
We have finally arrived at the definition of the Solomonoff-Levin measure function. The measure Q f is precisely the transformation of λ by universal monotone mapping f .
So there are in fact infinitely many such measures Q f , one for each choice of universal monotone mapping f . Each is a universal Σ 0 1 measure. It is this property that is exploited in the adequacy result.
Proposition 2. Q f fulfills (I').
Proof. Let µ ∈ ∆ 0 1 . The fact that Q f dominates µ entails that µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Q f (i.e., µ(A) > 0 implies Q f (A) for all A in the σ-algebra F), which by the classical result of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) Huttegger, 2015, 617-18) , so in particular (I').
4.
So how does the Solomonoff-Levin function evade Putnam's diagonalization? As we saw above, the very motivation for the expansion to the class of Σ 0 1 measures is to evade diagonalization -to obtain universal elements. The measure Q f is a universal element; as such, it tracks every ∆ 0 1 measure in the sense of (I'). The downside is that, as a universal Σ 0 1 element, Q f is itself no longer ∆ 0 1 (or the class of ∆ 0 1 would already have universal elements). Worse, as we will see in more detail in the penultimate section below, Q f fails to satisfy the even weaker effectiveness condition (II).
The force of Putnam's diagonalization proof is that no measure function can satisfy both (I) and (II), and Q f is no exception. The Solomonoff-Levin measure function is powerful enough to avoid diagonalization and fulfill (I), but the price to pay is that Q f might be said to be too powerful: it is no longer computable in the sense of (II). Does this invalidate Q f as an inductive method -let alone a universal one?
One reply is that we cannot hold this against Q f just like that, since, after all, Putnam has shown that this incomputability is really a necessary condition for a policy to be optimal in the sense of (I'): "an optimal strategy, if such a strategy should exist, cannot be computable . . . any optimal inductive strategy must exhibit recursive undecidability" (Hintikka, 1965, 283, fn. 22) . However, this reply seems to miss the second component of Putnam's charge. This is the claim that, while no measure function can fulfill both adequacy conditions, other methods couldin particular, the HD-method.
In the current section we turn our attention to this claim. As discussed already in some detail by Kelly et al. (1994, 99-112) , it actually turns out to be the weak spot in Putnam's argument. When we have this claim out of the way, we can, in the next section, consider the question of Q f 's adequacy afresh.
In order to assess Putnam's statement of the HD-method's adequacy, we have to consider the following two conditions, the generalizations of (I) and (II) to methods that are not necessarily measure functions (the original conditions are retrieved by inserting "instance confirmation greater than 0.5" for "accepted", cf. Putnam, 1963a, 771): (I*) Any true computable hypothesis h is (and forever remains) accepted after sufficiently many confirming individuals x 0 , ..., x n . (II*) For any true computable hypothesis h, for every n, it must be possible to compute an m such that if h(x n+1 ), ..., h(x n+m ) hold, then h is accepted after time n + m.
Again, it is important for Putnam's case against Carnap that the conditions (I*) and (II*) are not supposed to be mutually exclusive a priori ; or it would be a rather moot charge that indeed no measure function can satisfy them in tandem. No measure function can satisfy both -conditions (I) and (II) are mutually exclusivebut other methods can: and the hypothetico-deductive (HD) method that Putnam describes is to be the case in point. On a closer look, however, this assertion will appear a bit murky.
Recall that Putnam's HD method depends on the hypotheses that are actually proposed in the course of time. The HD method fulfills (III), which is so phrased as to accommodate this dependency: the method will come to accept (and forever stick to) any true computable hypothesis, if this hypothesis is ever proposed. Thus the HD method relies on some "hypothesis stream" (Kelly et al., 1994, 107) that is external to the method itself; and the method will come to embrace a true hypothesis whenever this hypothesis is part of the hypothesis stream.
In computability-theoretic terminology, the method uses the hypothesis stream as an oracle. The HD method is a simple set of rules, so obviously computable -given the oracle. But the oracle itself might be incomputable. Indeed, since the computable hypotheses (in the current context, computable infinite sequences) are not effectively enumerable, any hypothesis stream that contains all computable hypotheses is incomputable. This is why Putnam must view the oracle as external to the HD method. The alternative is to view the generation of a particular hypotheses stream η as part of the method itself ; but if any such HD-with-particularhypothesis-stream-η method -let us simply say "HD η method" -is powerful enough to satisfy (II*), then the hypothesis stream and hence the method HD η as a whole must be incomputable. Putnam is well aware of this: "it is easily seen that any method that shares with Carnap the feature: what one will predict 'next' depends only on what has so far been observed, will also share the defect: either what one should predict will not in practice be computable, or some law will elude the method altogether" (Putnam, 1963a, 773 ; also see the simple derivation of this fact in Kelly et al., 1994, 102-03) . In short, the HD η methods are in exactly the same predicament as Carnap's measure functions. Conditions (I*) and (II*) are mutually exclusive -unless we allow the method to be such that "the acceptance of a hypothesis also depends on which hypotheses are actually proposed" (Putnam, 1963a, 773) , i.e., allow the method access to an external hypothesis stream. But Putnam's assumption of an (incomputable) external oracle does, of course, raise questions of its own. The idea would be that we identify the oracle with the elusive process of the invention of hypotheses, the unanalyzable "context of discovery"; ultimately rooted, maybe, in "creative intuition" (Kelly et al., 1994, 108) or something of the sort. Is this process somehow incomputable? How would we know? Moreover, "if Putnam's favourite method is provided access to a powerful oracle, then why are Carnap's methods denied the same privilege?" (ibid., 107).
Kelly et al. offer Putnam the interpretation that the HD method provides an "architecture," a recipe for building particular methods (in our above terminology, HD η methods), that is "universal" in the sense that for every computable hypothesis, there is a particular computable instantiation of the architecture (a particular computable HD η method) that will come to accept (and forever stick to) the hypothesis if its true. "A scientist wedded to a universal architecture is shielded from Putnam's charges of inadequacy, since . . . there is nothing one could have done by violating the strictures of the architecture that one could not have done by honoring them" (ibid., 110). Kelly et al. are not convinced, though, that their suggestion saves Putnam's argument, for the reason that it makes little sense for Putnam to endorse a universal architecture while calling every particular instance inadequate and therefore "ridiculous" (ibid., 110-11; here they quote Putnam, 1974, 238) . There is, however, a more fundamental objection. Again, Putnam's argument against Carnap would only be completed if the above way out for the HD method were not open to measure functions. That is, it would only succeed if measure functions could not be likewise seen as instantiations of some universal architecture. But as a matter of fact, they can. They can be seen as instantiations of the classical Bayesian architecture. (Cf. Romeijn (2004) . I follow Diaconis and Freedman (1986, 11) in adopting the designation "classical Bayesian." Also see Skyrms (1996) .)
The classical Bayesian architecture employs a countable hypothesis class (where hypotheses are again measures over Cantor space), as well as a prior distribution that gives positive probability to every element of this hypothesis class. Given a hypothesis class H and prior w, the corresponding Bayes-with-particular-hypothesisclass-H method ξ H w -let us say "Bayes H method" ξ H w -is the measure function that is simply the w-weighted mean over the hypotheses in H, i.e., ξ
The classical Bayesian architecture is a universal architecture because for every (computable) deterministic hypothesis, there is a particular (computable) instantiation of the architecture (a Bayes H method where H contains the hypothesis) that will come to accept (and forever stick to) the hypothesis if it is true (in the sense of (I)). Just like the HD architecture is guaranteed to accept and stick to every true deterministic hypothesis, whenever it is included in the hypothesis stream, so the classical Bayesian architecture is guaranteed to accept every true deterministic hypothesis, whenever it is included in the hypothesis class. More generally, to also cover the case where the true hypothesis is in fact probabilistic, a Bayes H method will come to accept and forever stick to any true hypothesis, whenever it is in H, with (true) probability 1. Or, to put it more succinctly, a Bayes H method will almost surely converge on the true hypothesis whenever it is in H. This property is also known as Bayesian consistency. It follows from the exact same argument as the proof of Theorem 2, given the fact that ξ H w dominates every element in H: for every h ∈ H we clearly have for all x ∈ B * that ξ H w (x) ≥ w(h)h(x). Every measure function over Cantor space corresponds to a Bayes H method for some H and w. We can thus interpret any measure function as relying on a class of hypotheses -meeting Putnam's insistence on the indispensability of theory. Moreover, this point of view naturally accommodates a simplicity ordering of hypotheses that Putnam (inspired by Kemeny, 1953 ) envisages a refined HD method to employ (1963a, 775-77), and that in (1963b, 301-02) he proposes as a line of further investigation for inductive logic: "given a simplicity ordering of some hypotheses, to construct a c-function which will be in agreement with that simplicity ordering, that is, which will permit one to extrapolate any one of those hypotheses, and which will give the preference always to the earliest hypothesis in the ordering which is compatible with the data" (ibid., 302). The solution to this problem is the measure function Bayes H with a prior w that expresses the desired simplicity ordering on the hypotheses in H, assigning lower probability to hypotheses further away in the ordering.
In conclusion of this discussion, there is a perfect analogy between the situation for the HD method and for the classical Bayesian method. No particular measure function -Bayes H method -can satisfy both (I*) and (II*). But, similarly, no particular HD η method can satisfy both (I*) and (II*). Nevertheless, the HD architecture is universal. But, similarly, the classical Bayesian architecture is universal. From this perspective, Putnam's argument, purporting to show that measure functions have fundamental shortcomings that other methods do not, fails.
5.
We have observed that (I*) and (II*) are mutually exclusive: no particular method can satisfy both. Let us then follow up on the earlier suggestion to not dismiss the Solomonoff-Levin function Q f out of hand simply because it does not satisfy the special cases (I) and (II) -that it cannot do the impossible. Instead, let us conclude our survey with a fresh look at the question: could Q f be an adequate characterization of a "cleverest possible," a universal learning machine?
We can still, with Putnam, divide this question into two parts. First, in the spirit of (I), will Q f be able to accept every reasonable (reasonably effective) hypothesis, if it is true? Second, in the spirit of (II), is Q f itself still a reasonable (reasonably effective) method?
To start with the first. The best vantage point to address this question is to view Q f as an instantiation of the classical Bayesian architecture that we saw in the previous section. It turns out that the measure functions Q f are the classical Bayesian methods that employ the class of all Σ 0 1 hypotheses (also see Sterkenburg, 2016) . To be exact, the measure functions Q f are precisely the Bayes The hypothesis class embodies the regularities that can be extrapolated, the patterns that should gain higher instance confirmation from supporting instances. Thus we may rephrase our first question: is the hypothesis class H Σ 0 1 sufficiently wide, sufficiently general?
Before we turn to an answer, we connect this question to an important alternative perspective on Q f . This is the interpretation of Q f as an "a priori" distribution over the symbol sequences. Measure Q f "corresponds to what we intuitively understand by the words 'a priori probability,'" Zvonkin and Levin (1970, 104) write, because "if nothing is known in advance about the properties of [a] sequence, then the only (weakest) assertion we can make regarding it is that it can be obtained randomly with respect to [Q f ]". This is an illustration of how the question of the generality of H Σ 0 1 -the class of candidate measures that may be assumed to generate the data -is related to the question of the adequacy of Q f as an a priori probability assignment on the data sequences. Ultimately, the latter perspective is associated with the idea that inductive reasoning attains justification from some objective or rational starting point. It is in this spirit that Carnap (1962) writes that against our credences that are derived from a rational initial credence function (i.e., measure function), "Hume's objection does not hold, because [we] can give rational reasons for it" (ibid., 317): the rationality requirements that are codified as axioms constraining the measure function. It also seems in this spirit that Li and Vitányi (2008) , presenting Q f as a "universal prior distribution," make reference to Hume and claim that the "perfect theory of induction" invented by Solomonoff "may give a rigorous and satisfactory solution to this old problem in philosophy" (ibid., 347).
The problem with this idea is, to begin, that there is still subjectivity involved in pinning down the exact starting point. The choice of initial credence function (measure function) is "guided (though not uniquely determined ) by the axioms of inductive logic" (Carnap, 1971, 30, emphasis mine) . Likewise, the definition of Q f still leaves open the choice of f -from the classical Bayesian perspective, the choice of semicomputable prior w over H Σ 0
1
. (See Sterkenburg (2016) for more on this.) Bracketing this issue here, we still face a more fundamental problem: the problem of justifying the stipulated constraints on the measure functions. From the classical Bayesian perspective, this is the problem of justifying the choice of hypothesis class. And that brings us back to the question of the generality of the hypothesis class.
As Howson (2000) argues at length, the choice of prior distribution constitutes our inevitable "Humean inductive assumptions": "According to Hume's circularity thesis, every inductive argument has a concealed or explicit circularity. In the case of probabilistic arguments . . . this would manifest itself on analysis in some sort of prior loading in favour of the sorts of 'resemblance' between past and future we thought desirable. Well, of course, we have seen exactly that: the prior loading is supplied by the prior probabilities" (ibid., 88). (Also see Romeijn, 2004, 357ff.) It is important for the observation that Bayesian methods cannot escape Hume's argument that inductive assumptions must be restrictive: that it is impossible to have a prior over everything that could be true. That is, from the classical Bayesian perspective, it must be the case that no hypothesis class H can contain every possible hypothesis, that no H is fully general.
Could
fully general? Naturally, it is not. As a restriction on what hypotheses could be true, a metaphysical assumption on the world, not only would the restriction to any specific level of effective computability (∆ 0 1 , Σ 0 1 , . . . ) look arbitrary: the assumption of effective computability itself is a stipulation that wants motivation.
6.
There is, however, an alternative interpretation still. This interpretation is to take the elements of the class H Σ 0 1 , not as hypotheses about the origin of the data, but as competing inductive methods (cf. Sterkenburg, 2016) .
This interpretation is actually more in line with Putnam's demand that the ideal inductive policy or the universal learning machine should be able to eventually pick up any pattern that our actual inductive methods would. It is also more in line with Solomonoff's original aim that given "a very large body of data, the model is at least as good as any other that may be proposed " (1964, 5, emphasis mine) . (Noteworthy, moreover, is that Solomonoff's basic idea of sequential prediction by a mixture over the elements of a general class H is being developed in great depth as a vibrant branch of machine learning; here the stated goal is indeed to predict at least as well as any member of a pool H of competing "experts" without assumptions on the origin of the data (see Vovk, 2001a; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) .)
Let us see what we get when we thus reinterpret the Σ 0 1 measures as all possible inductive methods. As a start, Proposition 2 could be reinterpreted as a fully general merging-of-opinions result (see Huttegger, 2015) : every inductive method anticipates with certainty that Q f 's confirmation values converge to its own. Moreover, it is easy to derive the following more "absolute" fact. For any inductive method ν, there is a constant bound on the surplus logarithmic loss (expressing the divergence between the given confirmation values and the symbols that actually obtain) incurred by Q f relative to this method ν, on any symbol sequence (see the Appendix for details). Thus, if we take the Σ 0 1 measures as all possible inductive methods, then Q f is a universal inductive method in the following powerful sense: it is an inductive method that compared to any other inductive method will always come to perform at least as well.
We may brand this the optimality interpretation: rather than reliable (guaranteed with certainty to converge on the true hypothesis), Q f is optimal in the sense that it is guaranteed to converge on the true hypothesis if any method does. The inductive method Q f is vindicated in the sense of Reichenbach (see Salmon, 1991) .
In this interpretation, Q f is a universal learning machine -defying the lesson that has generally been taken from Putnam's proof that there can be no such thing (cf. Dawid, 1985, 341) . As we have seen, the crucial move to unlock this possibility after all, hence the crucial precondition to our optimality interpretation, is the expansion to the nondiagonalizable class of Σ 0 1 elements. The moment has come to answer the question whether this move is reasonable at all. Specifically, we need to answer the question that is the analogue in this interpretation to the first question we started the previous section with: is it reasonable to identify all possible inductive methods with the Σ Now an incomputable measure function is certainly "impractical" (Cover et al., 1989, 863) , or indeed "of no use to anybody" (Putnam, 1963a, 768) in any practical way -but that already goes for any measure function that is computable but not in some sense efficiently so. The minimal requirement that Putnam was after is computability in principle, i.e., given an unlimited amount of space and time. Indeed, under the Church-Turing thesis, computability is just what it means to be (in principle) implementable as an explicit method -computability is the minimal requirement to be a method at all. On this view, a ∆ 0 1 measure is a measure that corresponds to a method that (given unlimited resources) for any finite sequence returns the probability that the measure assigns to it. But, likewise, a Σ 0 1 measure still corresponds to a method that (given unlimited resources) for any finite sequence returns increasingly accurate approximations of its probability. So, albeit in a weaker sense, a Σ 0 1 measure is still connected to some explicit method. (Cf. MartinLöf on his choice of Σ 0 1 randomness tests: "on the basis of Church's thesis it seems safe to say that this is the most general definition we can imagine as long as we confine ourselves to tests which can actually be carried out and are not pure set theoretic abstractions" (1969, 268) .)
This seems good -but we passed over a crucial detail. This is the fact that for the purpose of inductive reasoning, we are actually interested in the conditional probabilities issued by the measure functions: those are the confirmation values.
For that reason inductive methods should actually be identified with two-place confirmation functions rather than the underlying one-place measure functions. But this has repercussions for the level of effectiveness. Namely, in particular, the con-
. This is essentially implied by the original diagonalization argument: one can verify that Q f (· | ·) ∈ Σ 0 1 would mean that Q f satisfies (II). For completeness, the following proof recounts the details of the diagonalization. (A different proof has been given by Leike and Hutter, 2015, 370-71.) 
, so that (II) holds for Q f . We can now construct a computable infinite sequence x ω as follows. Start calculating Q f (0 | 0 n ) from below in dovetailing fashion for increasing n ∈ N, until an n 0 such that Q f (0 | 0 n0 ) > 0.5 is found (since Q f satisfies (I) such n 0 must exist). Next, calculate Q(0 | 0 n0 10 n ) for increasing n until an n 1 with Q(0 | 0 n0 10 n1 ) > 0.5 is found. Continuing like this, we obtain a list n 0 , n 1 , n 2 , ... of positions; let x ω := 0 n0 10 n1 10 n2 1 . . . . Sequence x ω is computable, but by construction the instance confirmation of x ω will never remain above 0.5, contradicting (I).
Now we could argue that Q f (· | ·) is still ∆ 0 2 or limit computable, meaning that it still corresponds to a method that converges to any given finite sequence's probability in the limit (cf. ibid., 365). But the problem runs deeper. The problem is that we cannot recover the optimality interpretation for conditional measures.
Namely, if we accept that a ∆ 
7.
Thus we conclude our story on an unhappy note. We have discussed how Putnam's diagonalization argument shows that no method whatsoever -not just measure functions -can satisfy at the same time two conditions to qualify as a universal learning machine: the one on the ability to detect every true effectively computable pattern, the other on the effective computability of the method itself. On the principle that one should not aim for the impossible, we allowed ourselves to consider as candidate universal learning machines measure functions that satisfy the first condition but that fall short of the second; specifically, we considered the Solomonoff-Levin measure function. The overarching strategy we identified to evade Putnam's argument is to locate a sufficiently large class of measure functions that is immune to diagonalization, hence contains universal elements. If one could reasonably identify this class of measure functions with all possible inductive methods, then the universal elements would be vindicated as optimal inductive methods, as universal learning machines: they constitute methods that are in a strong sense at least as good as any other method. In particular, we saw that the Solomonoff-Levin measure functions were constructed as universal elements among the Σ 0 1 measures -and so, our hope ran, they could qualify as such optimal methods. Unfortunately, we found a fatal flaw in this strategy: inductive methods should be identified with two-place confirmation (conditional measure) functions rather than the underlying one-place measure functions. This affects their effectiveness properties, which ultimately means that no level in the arithmetical hierarchy yields an undiagonalizable class of inductive methods. Putnam's diagonalization argument is not so easily disposed of. This concludes the proof that (1) is bounded by a constant: since the bound (5) holds for any individual sequence of any length, it also holds for (4) and thus for (1).
Proposition 2 was in the main text only stated for measures µ in ∆ 0 1 : measures over {0, 1}
ω . To retrieve the merging-of-opinions variant of this result mentioned in the main text, we need to make it go through for Σ 0 1 measures, measures over {0, 1} ω ∪ {0, 1} * -indeed we need to make precise what "almost surely" should mean for such "semimeasures." We can do this as follows. Let a ν ∈ Σ 0 1 be represented by a measure ν over {0, 1, ∅} ω , with ∅ a "stopping symbol": we have ν (σ0) + ν (σ1) + ν (σ∅) = ν (σ) and we stipulate ν (σ) = ν(σ) and ν (σ∅∅) = ν (σ∅) for all σ ∈ {0, 1}
* . Then for all ν ∈ Σ 0 1
we have that Q f dominates ν , hence ν Q f and the Blackwell-Dubins theorem applies as before.
The absolute optimality property mentioned in the main text is just the individual sequence bound (5) above. To reformulate, for any ν ∈ Σ 0 1 , the sum of surplus prediction errors (regrets) of Q f relative to ν will always (for any sequence x s of any length s) be bounded by a constant:
